ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
A Mobile Ad hoc Network (MANET) is an autonomous system, in which mobile hosts connected by wireless links are free to move randomly and often act as a router sometimes [4, 5] .Therefore the limited wireless transmission range of each node gets executed by multi-hop packet forwarding. That is here nodes within each other's radio range communicate directly via wireless links while those are far apart uses other nodes as relays. This kind of network is well suited for the mission critical applications such as emergency relief, military operations where no pre-deployed infrastructure exists for communication. Due to the lack of authorization facilities, volatile network topology it is hard to detect malicious nodes [4, 5] , MANETs are highly vulnerable to attacks. Finally, in A MANET nodes might be battery-powered and might have very limited resources, which may make the use of heavy-weight security solutions undesirable [7, 8, 9, 10 and 11] . Many different types of attacks have been identified. This paper deals with the Denial of service attack (DoS) by a selfish node; this is the most common form of attack which decreases the network performance.
A selfish node does not intend to directly damage other nodes, but is unwilling to spend battery life, CPU cycles, or available network bandwidth to forward packets not of direct interest to it, even though it expects others to forward packets on its behalf. The reason behind this is 'saving one's own resource' by saving of battery power, CPU cycles or protecting wireless bandwidth in certain direction. A selfish node wants to preserve own resources while using the services of others and consuming their resources. Detecting routes and forwarding packets consumes local CPU time, memory, network-bandwidth, and last but not least energy. Therefore there is a strong motivation for a node to deny packet forwarding to others, while at the same time using their services to deliver own data. According to the attacking technique the selfish node can be defined in three different ways [1] SN1: These nodes take participation in the route discovery and route maintenance phases but refuses to forward data packets to save its resources.
SN2: These nodes neither participate in the route discovery phase nor in data-forwarding phase. Instead they use their resource only for transmissions of their own packets.
SN3: These nodes behave properly if its energy level lies between full energy-level E and certain threshold T1. They behave like node of type SN2 if energy level lies between threshold T1 and another threshold T2 and if energy level falls below T2, they behave like node of type SN1
One immediate effect of node misbehaviors and failures in wireless ad hoc networks is the node isolation problem due to the fact that communications between nodes are completely dependent on routing and forwarding packets. In turn, the presence of selfish node is a direct cause for node isolation and network partitioning, which further affects network survivability. Traditionally, node isolation refers to the phenomenon in which nodes have no (active) neighbors; however, we will show that due to the presence of selfish node, a node can be isolated even if active neighbors are available [2] . In Figure. 1, suppose node x3 is a selfish node. When node u initiates a route discovery to another node v, the selfish neighbors x3 may be reluctant to broadcast the route request from u. In this case, x3 behaves like a failed node. It is also possible for x3 to forward control packets; however, the situation could be worse since u may select x3 as the next hop and send data to it. Consequently, x3 may discard all data to be forwarded via it, and then communications between u and v cannot proceed. When all neighbors of u are selfish, u is unable to establish any communications with other nodes at a distance of more than one-hop away. In this case, we say that a node is isolated by its selfish neighbors. Note that selfish nodes can still communicate with other nodes (via their cooperative neighbors), which is different from failed nodes.
RELATED WORK
Several methods proposed to defend these attacks have been studied. These can be classified into three types: reputation based scheme, credit based approach and game theoretic approach [1] [3] [6] 
Reputation Based scheme
In a reputation based scheme [1] watchdog and path rater approach the IDS overhear neighbors' packet transmission promiscuously and notify misbehavior to the source node by sending a message. The source node collects the notifications and rates every other node to avoid unreliable nodes in finding a path. Though the scheme is easier to implement but it depends only on promiscuous listening that may results false identification. CONFIDANT (Cooperation of Nodes, Fairness in Dynamic Ad-hoc Networks), in this scheme the IDS performs task in a distributed ways the monitor node promiscuously observes route protocol behavior as well as packet transmission of neighbor node. The Trust manager sends ALARM messages on detection of misbehavior. The Reputation system: maintains a rating list and a blacklist for other nodes. The Path manager ranks paths according to the reputation of nodes along each path. This scheme uses both direct and indirect observations from other nodes. In this scheme the adversary nodes are black listed but not removed from the network. As the detection depends on the other nodes that reduces the reliability of the IDS because any one of the above mentioned nodes may provide false result that may blacklisted a nonadversary node. CORE (Collaborative Reputation) approach, here the source node observes usual packet transmission and the task specific behavior of neighbor nodes and rate the node by using the positive reports from other nodes. The malicious node with bad reputation rate is isolated. But in this approach reputation of node is not changed frequently, thus the nodes temporarily suffering from bad environmental conditions are not punished severely
Credit based scheme
Sprite Simple, cheat-proof, credit based system; here the node s send CAS (Central Authorized Server) a receipt for every packet they forward, CAS gives credits to nodes according to the receipt. This approach is useful as it is easy to implement but the major problem is scalability and message overhead.
Ad hoc-VCG(Vickery, Clarke and Groves) scheme ,this is a two phase approach in the Route Discovery phase destination node computes needed payments for intermediate nodes and notifies it to the source node or the central bank. In the Data Transmission phase actual payment is performed .This scheme is fully depends on the report of the destination node.
Game Theoretic scheme
In game theoretic scheme the IDS compares node's performance against other node based on a repeated game. This scheme is easy to implement but it needs fair comparison among nodes other wise it may falsely identify a node as adversary node.
MOTIVATIONS
The initial motivation for our work is to address limitations of current IDS systems by taking advantage of the mobile agent paradigm. Specifically, we address the following limitations of the earlier proposed IDS False Positive Rate: The IDS reduces the False Positive rate that may arise in Reputation based scheme, which effectively increase the network performance. Scalability: The process scalability of the credit based approach or any centralized approach is much lower. By using Mobile Agent the scalability may increase that enhance the network performance. Interdependencies: In the Credit based scheme the IDS depends on the report of the destination node that make the network not convenient that require for MANET. Centralized Authorization: Due to centralized authorization of previous IDS the IDS can not perform efficiently. In Mobile Agent based IDS the computation is done in distributed manner that increase the efficiency of the IDS.
PROPOSED WORK
Our objective is to find out the malicious node that performs the DOS by selfish node in network. The assumptions regarding the proposed work are listed below
Assumption
The following assumptions are taken in order to design the proposed algorithm. 1. A node interacts with its 1-hop neighbors directly and with other nodes via intermediate nodes using multi-hop packet forwarding. 2. Every node has a unique id in the network, which is assigned to a new node collaboratively by existing nodes. 3. The source node generates mobile agent after a specific period of time. 4. The mobile agent moves towards forward path created using RREQ and RREP. 5. The agent calculates the packet receive and forward by a node. 6. If the agent discovers a malicious node, instead of moving forward, it sends a report to the source node.
Architecture
Architecture of a Mobile agent based system: From the above figure, it is observed that the mobile agent performs three tasks. At first the mobile agent (MA) has to collect the raw data from the host machine then it computes the packet delivery ratio (P dr ) after computation it compares the resultant P dr with the predefined one and then gives responses to the source node accordingly. The table contains the source node id, destination node id that will be initiated by the source node. The HOP count field in the table denotes number of HOP between source node and destination node. THRESOLDP dr signifies the number of packet drop to be considered for any node in the forward path. The forward path is generated by the AODV routing protocol.
Methodology
The network is modeled based on the de-bruijn graph as follows: Node Sequence: The Node sequence describes a set of nodes where the link among the nodes are created in such a way that when the node n with bit sequence (a0n a1n a2n…. akn) is connected with a node m having a bit sequence (a0m a1ma2m…. akm) where 1<=m,n<=r-1], then (ajm = ai n +1) where 1<=i,j<=k-1. Each node has in-degree and out-degree r. k is the diameter of the network represent as graph [12] . Here, the degree depends on the number of nodes in the forward path but for sake of simplicity the rank is always kept two. For a network where the number of nodes in the forward path including source and destination node is 7 the degree (d) should be computed as C=7, r=2 We consider that d for which the following conditions are satisfied 1. (2d -C) is minimum 2. 2d >C i) d=1 2d =2 2<7 ii) d=2 2d=4 4<7 iii) d=3 2d=8 8>7 and 2d-1=1 iv) d=4 2d=16 16>7 2d-1=9 For the first two computations 2nd condition is not satisfied for the 4th computation 1st condition is not satisfied so the degree is taken as 3.The digits are {0,1,2} Here the node N2 sends acts as a malicious node RREQ messages to the node N2.The node N2 is a node in the forward path from source to destination node. N2 behaves as selfish node and refuse to forward packet to the neighbor node N3. When the MA comes to the node N2 it observes that the node behaves as malicious node by computing Pdr(N2,N3). This value is greater than THRESOLDPdr (N2, N3) and it send MMSG (Malicious Message) to the source node. 
Algorithm:
In the figure 4 the source nodes N 0 generates the mobile agent and send it to the closest neighbor N 1 . The MA at N 1 compute CPR (i, j) according to the equation 1. MA then calculates CPF (i, j) using equation 2, and then computes P dr (i, j) using equation 3. If the Pdr (i, j) is greater than THRESHOLDP dr (i, j), then MA readily informs the source node via the intermediate nodes . From figure 4 it is observed that the MA reaches the destination node only when the network is free from DoS attack by a selfish node. The source uses the same path for others packets to be sent.
/* The following algorithm depicts the task of a mobile agent*/ Begin
Step1: the source node N0 sends packet to the destination node N6
Step2: Start Timer T Step3: Wait for the acknowledgement from destination node
Step 4: increase T by unit time
Step 5: if T>Tout then Goto step 6 Else Goto step 3
Step 6: The node S generates Mobile Agent(MA) and provides it's own ID and send it to the next hop node
Step7: The mobile agent observe for i th node the number of packet receive from neighbor node j and compute CPR(i, j
Step 8: MA compute CPF(i,j)for the ith node
Step 9: MA compute Pdr(I,j) for the ith node at tth instance
Step 10: If the ratio is less than threshold for ith node
Then
The agent moves to the next hop node decrase hop count by 1 Else Agent reports the malicious activity to the source node End 6 PERFORMANCE ANALYSES
Simulation Metric
Simulation metrics are the important determinants of network performance, which have been used to compare the performance of the proposed scheme in the network. Where n is the total number of packet sends at i th instance to the destination node
Performance Evaluation
From figure 6 , we observe that the performance of the network in presence of malicious node degrades than the network with mobile agent. Due to presence of mobile agent the network performance improves as the network is prevented from the malicious node. Initially the Average Throughput of Receiving Packet is same implies that he network is free from network at that time instant. As the packet size increases the throughput decreases means due to packet overhead the throughput decreases. From figure 9, we observe that the performance of the network in presence of selfish node degrades than the network without any attack. When the network is under attack in presence of mobile agent then the performance of the network remain same as that in case of the network without attack.
In figure 10 , the series "a" indicates the average end to end delay in presence of DoS attack in the network. In series "b" the end to end delay increases as the packet size increases but the performance is better than that is shown in series "a". The pick of the graph denotes that at that point due to network congestion the delay is maximum.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The mobile ad-hoc network suffers from several types of intrusions, out of which, the denial of service attack by a selfish node is the one of them. The mobile agents travel through the network, gathering vital information. This information is then processed by the mobile agent itself. The choice of threshold value is very important to help the detection of the attacker as early as possible. The computation complexity of the MA is kept minimum so that computation overhead can be reduced. In this paper we only focus on the DoS attack caused by selfish node by refusing the packet delivery to the neighbor node. The computation overhead of our algorithm is much less as the computation is done by the MA when the source node notices that the destination node does not response in correct time. The nodes are also free from performing the computation. This feature of our proposed scheme increases the efficiency of each node thereby increasing the overall performance of the network. 
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